ARIES WP3 – Needs and Requirements Analyses by Gehrmann, Christian
 ARIES WP3    2011-03-29   Ver. 1.0 
 - 1 - 
ARIES WP3 – Needs and Requirements 
Analyses 
Jacob Löfvenberg and Jonas Hallberg Christian Gehrmann    Mehran Ahsant 
FOI         SICS       Saab Systems 
           
 ARIES WP3    2011-03-29   Ver. 1.0 
 - 2 - 
Abbreviations 
COTS  Commercial off the Shelf 
HW  Hardware 
IAN  Incident Area Network 
IP  Internet Protocol 
JAN  Jurisdiction Area Network 
PSCD  Public Safety Communications Device 
SDR   Software Defined Radio 
SW  Software 
VCT  Voice of the Customer Table 
 
 ARIES WP3    2011-03-29   Ver. 1.0 
 - 3 - 
Contents 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 5 
1.1 Motivation ....................................................................................................................... 5 
1.2 Problem Formulation ...................................................................................................... 5 
1.3 Contributions................................................................................................................... 6 
1.4 Report Layout ................................................................................................................. 6 
2 Background .............................................................................................................................. 7 
3 Trusted Communication using COTS ..................................................................................... 9 
3.1 Needs............................................................................................................................... 9 
3.1.1 Voice of the customer table ........................................................................................ 9 
3.1.2 Hierarchy diagram .................................................................................................... 13 
3.2 Requirements ................................................................................................................ 14 
4 Trust establishment for Cross-organizational Crises Management ....................................... 17 
4.1 Needs............................................................................................................................. 17 
4.1.1 Voice of the customer table ...................................................................................... 17 
4.1.2 Hierarchy diagram .................................................................................................... 26 
4.2 Requirements ................................................................................................................ 28 
5 Discussion .............................................................................................................................. 32 
5.1 Common requirements .................................................................................................. 32 
5.1.1 Communication security ........................................................................................... 32 
5.1.2 Node security ............................................................................................................ 32 
5.2 Major differences .......................................................................................................... 32 
5.3 Suggestions for next project phase ............................................................................... 33 
6 References ............................................................................................................................. 34 
Appendix 1: ARIES WP3 – Scenario Input: Trusted Communication using COTS ...................... 1 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 4 
2 Scenario description ................................................................................................................ 6 
2.1 Basic scenario ................................................................................................................. 6 
2.2 Network Scenario............................................................................................................ 7 
3 Actors....................................................................................................................................... 8 
3.1 Users ............................................................................................................................... 8 
 ARIES WP3    2011-03-29   Ver. 1.0 
 - 4 - 
3.2 Attacker ........................................................................................................................... 8 
3.3 Server .............................................................................................................................. 8 
4 Scope and Limitations ............................................................................................................. 9 
4.1 Research issues ............................................................................................................... 9 
Appendix 2: ARIES WP3 – Scenario Input: Trust Establishment for Cross-organizational 
Crises Management ......................................................................................................................... 1 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 4 
2 Scenario description ................................................................................................................ 5 
3 Actors....................................................................................................................................... 9 
3.1 JAN manager .................................................................................................................. 9 
3.2 NIB manager ................................................................................................................... 9 
3.3 PSCD user ....................................................................................................................... 9 
3.4 Attacker ........................................................................................................................... 9 
4 Scope ..................................................................................................................................... 10 
4.1 Limitations .................................................................................................................... 10 
4.2 Research issues ............................................................................................................. 10 
4.2.1 SDR life cycle ........................................................................................................... 10 
4.2.2 Trust establishment ................................................................................................... 11 
5 References ............................................................................................................................. 12 
 
 ARIES WP3    2011-03-29   Ver. 1.0 
 - 5 - 
1 Introduction 
As the importance of information for the business of organizations is increasing so is the need 
for adequate information security. The information security of organizations depends on the 
qualities of the systems processing, storing, and transferring the corresponding data. These 
information systems have human, organizational, and technical aspects. Even if the scope is 
limited to computer security, that is, leaving the issues of how humans and organizations 
handle business information, it remains vital to address the influence of humans and 
organizations on the IT part of the information systems.  
The ultimate goal, for any organization in this context, is to be able to perform efficacious 
information security risk management. For this purpose, it is vital to establish the security 
levels of the information systems of the organization.  
1.1 Motivation 
The foundation for the ability to reach adequate security levels is laid during the system 
development. However, providing viable security architectures is not enough; there has to be 
sufficient mechanisms for the stakeholders to be able to establish enough trust in these 
systems for their intended use. This is a vital prerequisite for efficacious information security 
risk management. 
Thus, when developing security mechanisms and architectures, in order to be able to provide 
appropriate solutions it is paramount to understand the needs of the stakeholders regarding 
the ability to trust these systems. Research on security architectures for trustworthy systems 
requires understanding of the corresponding needs in order to be able to focus on relevant 
issues. 
1.2 Problem Formulation 
The aim of the study is to capture the needs and requirements considering trust in information 
systems. To accomplish this, when trust, information systems, and stakeholders are 
considered in general, is not possible. Thus, approximations have to be accepted. The aim is 
to identify sets of relevant needs and requirements that will support the identification of 
relevant research issues. These sets should be validated in order to enhance and establish their 
suitability. 
One approach to identify needs and requirements is to use scenarios. An issue with this 
approach is that the scope of the study and, consequently the applicability of the results, may 
become limited to situations with contexts similar to the scenarios. Still, the use of scenarios 
supports the identification of needs and requirements and the scope of the study has to be 
limited in order to make it feasible.  
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The following are the main issues to be addressed during the study: 
 identifying suitable scenarios to be used as the basis for the needs and requirements 
analyses 
 identifying needs for trust based on the scenarios 
 transforming the identified needs into requirements. 
1.3 Contributions 
The results presented in this report include: 
 Two sets of needs for trust resulting from the analyses of the scenarios included in the 
appendices. The two sets of needs are presented in Chapter 3 and 4 respectively. 
 Two sets of requirements on mechanisms for trust in security architectures. These sets 
result from the analyses of the identified needs. The two sets of requirements are 
presented in Chapter 3 and 4 respectively. 
1.4 Report Layout 
In Chapter 2, the necessary background is presented in the form of a list of terms used in the 
report. In Chapter 3, the needs and requirements identified using the scenario ―Trusted 
Communication using COTS‖ are described. In Chapter 4, the needs and requirements 
identified using the scenario ―Trust Establishment for Cross-organizational Crises 
Management‖ are described. Finally, in Chapter 5, the results are discussed. 
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2 Background 
In this chapter the terminology relevant for this report is introduced. 
COTS 
Commercial off-the-shelf, COTS, are commercial components and products that are widely 
available. 
Information security 
Information security relates to information assets and the ability to uphold security-related 
characteristics, such as confidentiality, integrity, and availability [1]. Consequently, 
information security is a vast area including administrative as well as technical security 
issues. Contrary to IT security, information security includes issues related to information 
processing not connected to information (IT) systems, such as transmission by speech or 
paper documents. 
Information system 
Information systems collect, process, store and distribute information. The term has a general 
meaning, but is most often used for computer-based information systems. The definition 
includes the technical equipment of a system as well as its human activities and routines [2]. 
Need 
Needs describe activities or resources that are required to be able to perform tasks or reach 
goals. Needs are related to stakeholders. They can be conscious or unconscious, real or 
imagined, and satisfied or unsatisfied. Outspoken needs are often related to implicit 
requirements for action or change. 
Requirement 
In the context of information systems, requirements describe what should be implemented by 
specifying demands on system behavior, properties, or attributes [3]. 
Software-defined radio 
Software-defined radio (SDR) refers to wireless communication in which the transmitter 
modulation is generated or defined by a computer, and the receiver uses a computer to 
recover the signal information. To select the desired modulation type, the proper programs 
must be run by microcomputers that control the transmitter and receiver. 
System 
A system consists of cooperating entities working together with a common purpose. 
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Trust 
Trust should in this report be interpreted in terms of communication or computing system, 
i.e., to what extent the users are convinced that the system behaves as expected and that it 
does not perform any hostile operations. 
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3 Trusted Communication using COTS 
This chapter describes the needs and requirements identified using the scenario ―Trusted 
Communication using COTS‖. The scenario is further described in Appendix 1 and gives a 
background that is beneficial for understanding this chapter. 
The scenario uses made up names for the entities, but in reality it is a secure communication 
system which is to be designed by FOI. 
For the requirements process we have in principle followed the methodology described in [4]. 
The process consists of the following steps: 
1. collect data 
2. identify statements 
3. determine needs 
4. analyze needs 
5. determine architecture-driving requirements 
6. analyze architecture-driving requirements 
The first step, data collection, is typically done through interviews, workshops, or document 
studies. In this study, the data collection is based on one interview conducted with an end 
user of the future system included in the scenario. It would have been valuable with input 
from more users, but this has not been possible within the scope of this study. Still, the data 
collection yielded sufficient material to perform an analysis, based on the methodology 
presented in [4]. Since the material is rather limited in size, we have merged steps 2 and 3, 
yielding the Voice of the Customer Table (VCT) in Section 3.1.1. Next, we have analyzed the 
identified needs; the results are summarized in the hierarchy diagram in Section 3.1.2. 
Finally, we have determined the requirements, the result of which is given in the table in 
Section 3.2.  
3.1 Needs 
3.1.1 Voice of the customer table 
In Table 1 below, we have extracted statements based on the end user interview. In practice 
we first identified statements in the interview notes, which we have entered in the first 
column below. These have then been refined into needs, the last column. 
Statement Who What When Where Why How Need 
1. The system shall 
replace open 
communication over 
telephone and 
Internet. 
The users Communi
cation 
When 
travelling 
Abroad To be able 
to exchan-
ge infor-
mation 
 1.  A 
communi-
cation 
solution 
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Statement Who What When Where Why How Need 
2. For simple 
documents secure 
communication using 
e-mail, protected by 
GnuPG cards, is ok. 
But when 
communication is 
more intensive, with 
people placed abroad, 
something more is 
needed. 
The users Communi
cation 
When 
travelling 
Abroad To be able 
to exchan-
ge infor-
mation 
More 
efficient 
than e-
mail 
2. A 
simple 
and con-
venient  
communic
ation 
solution 
3. In long, spoken 
communication, there 
is a greater probability 
of revealing sensitive 
information. With 
documents you are 
usually more careful 
with washing and 
checking. When in a 
hurry, you usually use 
the simple solution, 
i.e. the telephone. 
The 
informatio
n owner 
Protect 
communic
ation. 
When 
travelling 
Abroad To avoid 
confiden-
tiality 
breach 
 3. Confi-
dentiality 
protection 
for the co-
mmunica-
tion 
4.  A person abroad 
may need to 
communicate with 
other experts at home. 
A solution is a server 
at home and mobile 
computers capable of 
communicating with 
the server. Exchange 
of documents, e-mail, 
chat and sometimes 
video conferencing is 
needed. 
The users Communi
cation 
When 
travelling 
Abroad To be able 
to exchan-
ge infor-
mation 
Over 
public, 
easily 
accessed 
networks 
4. A com-
municatio
n system 
for public, 
easily 
accessed 
networks 
5. The rooms from 
which the 
communication is 
done can be 
considered secure. 
What is critical is the 
link between clients 
and server. 
The 
informatio
n owner 
Protect 
communic
ation 
When 
travelling 
Abroad To avoid 
confiden-
tiality 
breach 
By 
protecting 
the links 
between 
clients and 
server 
5. A se-
cure con-
nection 
between 
clients 
and server 
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Statement Who What When Where Why How Need 
6. It would be 
convenient to be able 
to use the same 
physical machine both 
for normal work and 
for secure 
communication, 
perhaps using two 
unremoveable hard 
drives. 
The users Communi
cation and 
work 
When 
travelling 
Abroad To be able 
to exchan-
ge infor-
mation 
and work 
 6.A sys-
tem that is 
easy to 
use with 
regard to 
the num-
ber and 
size of 
hardware 
devices 
7. It should take 6-8 
hours for an attacker 
to modify a captured 
computer in a way 
that affects security. 
You have to be able to 
bring your computer 
when travelling, 
without using special 
transports. The 
security of the 
computers must not 
prevent the user from 
bringing it, or even 
leaving it 
unsupervised for a 
few hours. 
The users Convenien
t access to 
the 
computer 
When 
travelling 
Abroad To keep 
using the 
secure 
solution 
and not 
fall back 
to usage 
of simpler, 
insecure 
solutions 
 
 7.  The 
client has 
to be tam-
per pro-
tected and 
penetra-
tion pro-
tected and 
have 
strong 
authenti-
cation as 
well as a 
high level 
of soft-
ware 
integrity 
8. Usage must be 
simple and 
convenient, or it will 
not be used. GnuPG is 
considered simple and 
convenient.  
The users Simple 
and 
conve-
nient, 
secure 
communic
ation  
system 
When 
travelling 
Abroad For the 
communi-
cation 
system to 
really be 
used 
 8. A 
secure 
communi-
cation 
system 
that is so 
easy to 
use that 
users are 
not temp-
ted to 
revert to 
simpler, 
insecure 
means for 
communi-
cation 
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Statement Who What When Where Why How Need 
9. Since not all people 
are equally security 
aware, there is a need 
for being able to 
verify the security 
compliance of others. 
The users A method 
for 
verifying 
the 
security 
level of 
the other 
part in a 
communic
ation 
session 
When 
travelling 
or at home  
Abroad or 
at home 
To be able 
to trust the 
confi-
dentiality 
protection 
when ex-
changing 
informa-
tion 
 9. A way 
of veri-
fying the 
security of 
the other 
part in a 
communi-
cation 
session 
10. The customers 
trust in the system 
designer is what is 
important. The 
customers want a 
solution like this. 
System 
designer 
Create 
customer 
trust in 
system 
designer 
in inter-
national 
coopera-
tion 
when 
needed 
to be able 
to attract 
customers 
by 
offering a 
secure 
communi-
cation 
solution 
10. To be 
able to 
offer a 
secure 
communi-
cation 
solution 
11. How much 
security do we want? 
The problem is the 
balance. How secure 
should it be? 100% 
secure is not possible 
to achieve. 
It must not be to 
complicated to use. 
As secure as possible, 
but still usable. 
The 
customer 
A secure 
system 
that does 
not put the 
users off 
In inter-
national 
coopera-
tion 
Abroad To be able 
to establ-
ish coope-
ration 
between 
customers 
and FOI 
By 
making 
the 
security 
solution 
easy to 
use 
11. A 
com-
munica-
tion solu-
tion that is 
secure 
enough 
and that is 
still 
accepted 
by the 
users 
12. The system needs 
better security [than 
now] due to an aimed 
interest against the 
system. 
The 
customer 
A commu-
nication 
system 
allowing 
secure 
exchange 
of sensi-
tive infor-
mation 
In inter-
national 
coopera-
tion 
Abroad To be able 
to establ-
ish and 
maintain 
coopera-
tion bet-
ween cus-
tomers 
and FOI 
 12. A 
com-
munica-
tion solu-
tion that is 
secure 
enough 
conside-
ring the 
threat 
level 
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Statement Who What When Where Why How Need 
13. It is very 
important to keep the 
trust in the security 
level of the system 
designer 
System 
designer 
Document
ation 
supporting 
the claim 
that FOI is 
a trust-
worthy 
partner 
In inter-
national 
coopera-
tion 
Where 
needed 
To be able 
to establ-
ish and 
maintain 
coopera-
tion bet-
ween cus-
tomers 
and FOI 
By 
offering a 
secure 
communi-
cation 
solution 
13. A 
com-
munica-
tion solu-
tion that is 
secure 
enough 
conside-
ring the 
threat 
level 
14. We anticipate 
really potent 
adversaries, e.g.  
intelligence agencies. 
The 
customer 
A commu-
nication 
system 
allowing 
secure 
exchange 
of sensi-
tive infor-
mation 
In inter-
national 
coopera-
tion 
Abroad To be able 
to trust the 
confi-
dentiality 
protection 
when ex-
changing 
informa-
tion 
By offe-
ring a 
security 
solution 
with a 
high level 
of secu-
rity, both 
for the 
nodes and 
the com-
municatio
n stream 
14. A 
com-
munica-
tion solu-
tion with a 
high level 
of secu-
rity, both 
for the 
nodes and 
the com-
municatio
n stream 
15. There should be 
not great extra costs 
after the initial cost. 
There is an 
acceptance for system 
development costs, 
but the individual 
client computers must 
not be much more 
expensive than 
standard laptops (e.g. 
at most SEK 10000 
extra) ant not very 
much more 
cumbersome to 
administrate. 
The 
customer 
 
A commu-
nication 
system 
that is 
relatively 
cheap 
In inter-
national 
coopera-
tion 
Abroad For the 
communi-
cation 
system to 
be used 
enough 
By using 
standard 
compo-
nents 
(COTS) 
15. A 
com-
munica-
tion solu-
tion with a 
price com-
parable to 
an expen-
sive lap-
top 
 
Table 1: VCT derived from end user interview 
3.1.2 Hierarchy diagram 
The needs in Table 1 above have been reworked and restructured. This has resulted in that 
needs have been joined, rephrased and some new, less specific needs have been added. The 
result of this work is shown in the hierarchy diagram in Figure 1 below. 
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A way of verifying 
the security of the 
other part in a 
communication 
session (9)
 
A communication 
solution that is 
secure enough 
considering the 
threat level
(12, 13, 14)
 
Protection of the 
node (7)
 
Node tamper 
protection  (7)
 
Node intrusion 
protection (7)
 
Confidentiality 
protection for the 
communication (3)
 
A secure 
connection 
between clients 
and server (5,10)
 
Communication 
over public, easily 
accessed 
networks (4)
 
Communication 
solution (1)
 
Simple, conve-
nient and efficient 
communication 
solution (2)
 
A system that is so 
easy to use that 
users are not 
tempted to revert 
to simpler, inse-
cure means (8, 11)
A system that is 
easy to use with 
regard to the 
number and size 
of hardware 
pieces (6)
 
A communication 
solution with 
clients about as 
costly as 
expensive laptops 
(15)
 
Strong 
authentication (7)
 
High level of soft-
ware integrity (7)
 
 
Figure 1: Hierarchy diagram. 
3.2 Requirements 
Finally, in Table 2 below we formulate requirements corresponding to the needs identified in 
the previous steps.   
Need Requirements 
A communication solution with a price 
comparable to an expensive laptop (15) 
The main part of the hardware in the system shall be COTS (15) 
The client hardware shall be COTS (15) 
The main part of the software in the system shall be COTS (15) 
To build a client must not be cost dominating (15) 
Client administration must not be cost dominating (15) 
 ARIES WP3    2011-03-29   Ver. 1.0 
 - 15 - 
Need Requirements 
Communication is to be done over a 
publicly available, easily accessed 
network (4) 
It shall be possible to use the Internet for the communication stream 
(4) 
Communication shall be possible over mobile broadband (4)  
Communication shall be possible over WiFi (4) 
A system that is so easy to use that the 
users are not tempted to revert so 
simpler, insecure means of 
communication (8, 11) 
A short training session shall be enough for a user to correctly 
handle the system (8, 11) 
It shall be possible to transfer documents to and from the user’s 
communication software (8, 11) 
Starting the client and its communication software shall be quick 
enough not to discourage from using them (8, 11) 
The client communication software shall have a user interface that 
is orderly and logical (8, 11) 
The client communication software shall be designed by a person 
with knowledge of, and interest in, usability (8, 11) 
The client communication software shall require little interaction 
with the user (8, 11) 
A system that is easy to use with regard 
to the size and number of hardware 
devices (6) 
The communication client shall either be run in the user’s work 
laptop, or in a physically small hardware device(6) 
Any hardware in excess of the client hardware, shall be very small 
(6) 
Confidentiality protection for the 
communication stream (3) 
 
The communication stream shall be encrypted with a strong 
cryptographic algorithm, except in parts of the client or server that 
are logically secure (3) 
The software treating the unprotected communication stream shall 
be carefully reviewed and be without known defects (3) 
The clients shall have some function for verifying and/or protect the 
integrity of the parts of the software treating the unprotected 
communication stream (3, 7) 
The communication protocol shall be designed to prevent man-in-
the-middle attacks (3) 
A way of verifying the security of the 
other part in a communication session (9) 
When two nodes negotiate to establish a communication session 
there shall be a method for verifying integrity and version of the 
other part’s soft- and hardware (9) 
When a node negotiates with another node, no communication 
session shall be established if the integrity of the other part cannot 
be verified, nor if the other part’s soft- or hardware version cannot 
be considered secure (9)  
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Need Requirements 
Node intrusion prevention (7) Software and data at the communication system clients shall be 
encrypted with a strong cryptographic algorithm when they are not 
used or under the supervision of a trusted person (7) 
The communication system nodes (both server and clients) shall use 
operation systems and programs especially designed and configured 
for security (7) 
The communication system nodes (both server and clients) shall 
have as few services, programs and functions as possible installed 
and active (7) 
The communication system nodes (both server and clients) shall 
have protection against malicious software (7) 
Strong authentication (7) To be able to use the clients in the communication system it shall be 
required both password/passphrase and a tamper protected physical 
object cryptographically authenticated by the client (7) 
Before a communication session is established, the identity of the 
node of the other part shall be verified using cryptographic 
mechanisms (3, 7, 9) 
Node tamper protection (7) The client hardware shall be designed so that it cannot be physically 
opened using standard tools without it being easily detectable 
afterwards (7) 
The client hardware shall be designed so that it cannot be physically 
modified using standard tools without it being easily detectable 
afterwards (7) 
High level of node software integrity (7) The clients shall have some function for verifying and/or protect the 
integrity of the parts of the software treating the unprotected 
communication stream (3, 7) 
Table 2: Requirements list 
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4 Trust establishment for Cross-organizational Crises 
Management 
This chapter describes the identified needs and requirements for the Aries WP3 ―Trust 
Establishment for Cross-organizational Crises Management‖. The scenario is further 
described in Appendix 2 and gives a background that is beneficial for understanding this 
chapter.  
For the requirements process we have in principle followed the methodology described in [4]. 
The process consists of the following steps: 
1. collect data 
2. identify statements 
3. determine needs 
4. analyze needs 
5. determine architecture-driving requirements 
6. analyze architecture-driving requirements 
The first step, data collection, is typically done through interviews, workshops, or document 
studies. As we do not have direct connection to end-users for the chosen scenario, we have 
purely based this part on documents. This is not any major problem as there already are 
substantial relevant requirements work performed in the related Euler project [5].  We have 
used requirement [6] and design [7] documents from that project as primary data sources and 
we do not specifically document that process step in this report. Furthermore, we have 
merged steps 2 and 3, the result is summarized in Voice of the Customer Tables (VCT) in 
Section 4.1.1. Next, we have analyzed the identified needs, the results are summarized in the 
hierarchy diagram in Section 4.1.2. Finally, we have determined and sorted the architecture 
driving requirements based on the previously identified needs. The results are summarized in 
Section 4.2. This work has to a large extend been a rather straightforward process as we 
already had good requirements input from the Euler project documented in [6]. 
4.1 Needs 
4.1.1 Voice of the customer table 
In Table 2 below, we have extracted statements based on the security analysis performed in 
[7]. In particular the threat analyses, with respect to the following two threats, are relevant for 
the scenario we are considering: 
 Threats on interacting heterogeneous wireless communication systems in a crises 
area, 
 Threats on SDR as programmable and re-configurable radio system. 
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The results from the primary source document are mainly obtained through threat analysis 
and do not identify need per se. However, these threats can be formulated in terms on needs 
which we have done. 
 
Statement Who What When Where Why How Need 
1.1 Security is critical 
to public safety radio 
because failures such 
as successful attacks 
on radio functionality 
or compromise of 
information could 
gravely impact the 
lives of public safety 
users and the people 
they serve 
PSCD 
users 
Incident 
system 
When in 
use 
In the 
field 
Critical 
for 
rescuing 
human 
lives 
Secure 
system 
design 
Robust and secure 
system design that 
will provide 
trustworthy incident 
information to the 
end users 
1.2 Fear of 
unauthorized use of 
application and 
network services 
PSCD 
user, 
NIB 
manager 
as well 
as JAN 
manager 
PSCD, 
NIB 
When a 
PSCD 
device gets 
loss or 
system left 
unprotecte
d  
In the 
field 
Insecure 
system 
design 
System 
under 
attack 
Secure access 
control and 
authentication 
mechanism on 
PSCD and NIB units 
1.3 Fear of 
unauthorized 
modification of 
software 
PSCD 
user, 
NIB 
manager 
as well 
as JAN 
manager 
PSCD, 
NIB 
When 
downloadi
ng 
software 
for 
reconfiguri
ng PSCD 
or NIB 
Anywher
e 
Insecure 
system 
design 
System 
under 
attack 
Secure software 
installation and 
upgrade routines on 
PSCD and NIB 
devices 
1.4 Fear of 
malfunctioning radio 
equipment 
PSCD 
user and 
NIB 
manager 
NIB When 
downloadi
ng 
software 
for 
reconfiguri
ng NIB 
Anywher
e 
Insecure 
system 
design 
System 
under 
attack 
Secure software 
installation and 
upgrade routines on 
NIB devices 
1.5 Fear of SDR NIB 
compromise through 
scripted attacks 
NIB 
manager 
NIB At any 
NIB 
software 
installation 
or  change 
Anywher
e 
Insecure 
system 
design 
System 
under 
attack 
Secure NIB software 
execution 
environment 
1.6 Fear of SDR NIB 
compromise through 
usage of 
unlicensed/unsupporte
NIB 
manager 
NIB At any 
NIB 
software 
installation 
Anywher
e 
Insecure 
system 
design 
Bad 
software 
control 
Strict control of NIB 
software installation 
and usage 
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d OS and software or  change routines 
1.7 We need protection 
against attacks that 
replace legal NIB 
software payload at 
software upgrade 
NIB 
manager 
NIB At NIB 
software 
upgrade 
At 
software 
upgrade 
Insecure 
system 
design 
Software 
upgrade 
routines 
under 
attack 
Secure NIB software 
upgrade routines 
1.8 Fear of 
downloading invalid 
NIB software updates 
NIB 
manager 
NIB At NIB 
software 
upgrade 
At 
software 
upgrade 
Bad 
software 
upgrade 
routines 
Availabil
ity of bad 
software 
upgrade 
packages 
Secure NIB software 
upgrade routines 
1.9 Fear of bugs in 
NIB software  
NIB 
manager 
NIB Any time Anywher
e 
Insecure 
system 
design 
Bad 
software 
develop
ment 
process 
Strict verification of 
approved NIB 
software such as 
formal 
verification/evaluati
on of NIB software 
1.10 Fear of NIB 
hardware tampering 
NIB 
manager 
NIB When NIB 
is left 
unprotecte
d 
Anywher
e 
Insecure 
NIB 
hardware 
design 
NIB 
hardware 
under 
attack 
Tamper resistant 
NIB hardware 
design 
1.11 The NIB node 
implementation must 
ensure that only 
necessary and 
authorized 
communications flow 
from one domain to 
the other. 
NIB 
manager 
NIB When 
connecting 
two 
different 
IANs 
Anywher
e 
In order 
to protect 
IAN 
internal 
informati
on 
Sound 
NIB 
authentic
ation, 
authoriza
tion and 
access 
control 
mechanis
m in 
place 
The NIB node 
implementation 
must ensure that 
only necessary and 
authorized 
communications 
flow from one 
domain to the other 
1.12 All the 
communications 
strictly internal to the 
IAN, and all the 
databases stored in the 
NIB section of the 
node, must be kept 
away from prying eyes 
accessing the node via 
the Euler waveform, or 
from 
SW modules installed 
on the node, unless 
NIB 
manager 
NIB When 
connecting 
two 
different 
IANs 
Anywher
e 
In order 
to protect 
IAN 
internal 
informati
on 
Sound 
NIB 
authentic
ation, 
authoriza
tion and 
access 
control 
mechanis
m in 
place 
The NIB software 
integrity must 
always be kept both 
at configuration and 
run time. The NIB 
must implement and 
enforce IAN to 
external IAN 
security policies. 
The NIB must 
perform the 
necessary 
authentication and 
trust verification of 
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duly authorized connecting NIBs 
from other IANs. 
1.13 Develop a policy 
driven configuration 
framework for SDR 
that : 
- download policies 
on the fly 
- verifies their 
certification 
- parses, compiles 
and loads the 
policies 
- activates the 
desired radio 
device 
- provide attestation 
of its 
configuration to 
service providers 
JAN 
manager 
NIB At NIB 
software 
update 
Anywher
e 
Prevent 
comprom
ised NIB 
SDR 
 NIB SDR policy 
framework: 
- download 
policies on the 
fly 
- verifies their 
certification 
- parses, compiles 
and loads the 
policies 
- activates the 
desired radio 
device 
- provide 
attestation of its 
configuration to 
service 
providers 
1.14 Certify 
authenticity of 
configuration software 
and validity of the 
configuration to an 
external entity : 
- Prevent loading, 
installation, 
instantiation of 
unauthorized 
software 
- Verify 
downloaded 
software from 
trusted vendor 
- Ensure 
confidentiality and 
integrity of over-
the-air software 
download and 
stored data 
- Ensure the 
terminal operates 
within allowed 
frequency bands 
JAN 
manager 
NIB At NIB 
software 
update 
Anywher
e 
Prevent 
comprom
ised NIB 
SDR 
 Strict control over 
NIB SDR software 
installation, boot and 
upgrade procedure: 
- Prevent loading, 
installation, 
instantiation of 
unauthorized 
software 
- Verify 
downloaded 
software from 
trusted vendor 
- Ensure 
confidentiality 
and integrity of 
over-the-air 
software 
download and 
stored data 
- Ensure the 
terminal 
operates within 
allowed 
frequency bands 
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and power levels 
specified by local 
regulators 
and power 
levels specified 
by local 
regulators 
1.15 Identify and 
authorize SDR users, 
i.e.,  use a voice 
authentication 
application that 
identifies and 
authorizes SDR users, 
allowing specific radio 
capabilities to be 
unlocked depending on 
the user. For example, 
a software defined 
radio for emergency 
response with a voice 
authentication 
application and 
security profiles 
enabling an identifier 
response commander 
to use the radio to 
communicate on a 
number of private 
bands reserved for 
responding teams—
police, fire, medical, 
etc. 
NIB 
users 
Voice 
based 
authentic
ation of 
NIB user 
When 
using NIB 
SDR 
modules 
Anywher
e 
User 
authentic
ation 
Voice 
authentic
ation 
mechanis
ms 
NIB voice 
authentication 
mechanisms that 
control radio 
capabilities based on 
NIB SDR policy 
settings. 
1.16 System security 
requirements on 
confidentiality 
protection on: 
- Owner /user 
/equipment 
information e.g., 
Identity and 
physical position. 
- Cryptographic 
data (Keys, 
passwords, PINs 
and access codes) 
 
All users Data are 
not 
exposed 
to 
unauthori
zed users 
during 
the 
transition 
or in a 
database 
Always Anywher
e 
Exposure 
of 
sensitive 
informati
on and 
data can 
affect the 
emergen
cy 
operation
s 
Data 
shall be 
kept 
confident
ial 
Confidentiality 
protection of: 
- Owner /user 
/equipment 
information 
e.g., Identity 
and physical 
position. 
- Cryptographic 
data (Keys, 
passwords, 
PINs and access 
codes) 
 
1.17 Integrity 
protection of: 
All users Data are 
not 
modified 
Always Anywher
e 
Modified 
or 
corrupted 
Data 
shall be 
protected 
Integrity protection 
of:  
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- User traffic 
- Network Control 
and management 
data 
- Radio control data 
- Configuration data 
for SDR (platform 
and SDR 
Waveforms) 
- Cryptographic 
data (Keys, 
passwords, PINs 
and access codes) 
- Security policies 
for SDR platform 
- SDR waveforms 
and user roles 
login data 
- SDR platform SW 
including 
cryptographic 
algorithms and 
parameters 
- SDR platform hw 
including 
cryptographic 
modules 
 
or 
corrupted 
during 
the 
transition 
or 
directly 
in the 
database 
data can 
affect the 
emergen
cy 
operation
s 
against 
unauthori
zed 
modificat
ion 
- User traffic 
- Network 
Control and 
management 
data 
- Radio control 
data 
- Configuration 
data for SDR 
(platform and 
SDR 
Waveforms) 
- Cryptographic 
data (Keys, 
passwords, 
PINs and access 
codes) 
- Security 
policies for 
SDR platform 
- SDR 
waveforms and 
user roles login 
data 
- SDR platform 
SW including 
cryptographic 
algorithms and 
parameters 
- SDR platform 
HW including 
cryptographic 
modules 
 
1.18 It shall be 
possible for an 
authorized NIB 
manager to set SDR 
platform parameters. 
After loading the 
configuration 
parameter set(s) shall 
be checked by the 
radio for integrity and 
authenticity and for 
NIB 
manager 
Configur
ing the 
SDR 
devices 
and 
check the 
authentic
ity of 
configura
tions 
Always  Before 
and 
during 
the 
emergen
cy 
operation 
Unauthor
ized user 
shall not 
be able 
to change 
the 
configura
tions. 
By 
limiting 
configura
tion to 
authorize
d users, 
verifying 
the 
authentic
ity and 
integrity 
It shall be possible 
for an authorized 
NIB manager to set 
SDR platform 
parameters. After 
loading the 
configuration 
parameter set(s) 
shall be checked by 
the radio for 
integrity and 
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compatibility.  A failed 
integrity and 
authenticity check 
shall cause rejection of 
the configuration 
parameter set(s). 
The result of an 
integrity and 
authenticity check for 
received configuration 
parameter set(s) shall 
be an auditable event. 
of 
changes 
and  
keeping 
trace of 
applied 
modificat
ions.  
authenticity and for 
compatibility.  A 
failed integrity and 
authenticity check 
shall cause rejection 
of the configuration 
parameter set(s). 
The result of an 
integrity and 
authenticity check 
for received 
configuration 
parameter set(s) 
shall be an auditable 
event. 
Table 2: VCT derived from [7]. 
Table 3 summarizes the needs identified from the requirements analysis done by the Euler 
project [6]. Similar to our activity, the Euler project has derived functional requirements for a 
broader scenario than the one we are analyzing. Furthermore, the focus has not been on 
security, which implies that a rather limited set of security requirements have been defined 
and those are on a very high level. Consequently, they provide a valuable input to our 
activity, but need to be complemented with more detailed requirements that is the result of 
our in depth analysis of the needs identified in Table 2 and Table 3. 
 
Statement Who What When Where Why How Need 
2.1 The fear of  
inappropriate or 
insufficient level of 
protection on  
sensitive data, 
transmitted 
between all  
organizations 
involved in  
emergency 
communications  
 
Origina
tor of 
data 
Sufficient 
level of 
protection 
Specifying 
the level of 
protection 
s for transit 
data  
Anywhere The same 
level of 
protection 
shall be 
provided 
Ensurin
g the 
same 
level of 
protecti
on 
when 
transmit
ting 
data 
For all emergency 
communication, 
the organizations 
involved have to 
make sure that 
data is protected 
according to its 
sensitivity level 
during 
transmission, 
processing and 
storage and that 
access to 
communication 
channels and 
critical systems is 
only granted to 
authorized 
persons. 
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2.2 The concerns 
regarding 
degradation of 
performance 
caused by conflicts 
between each 
individual or 
national 
jurisdiction 
security 
requirements and 
other nation’s 
requirements. 
Networ
k end-
users 
Incompatib
ility 
between 
security 
requiremen
ts 
During 
communic
ations 
Anywhere Same level 
of 
performanc
e shall be 
ensured 
Expand
ability 
of 
security 
require
ments  
The basic security 
platforms should 
be capable of 
being expanded 
and enhanced to 
meet each 
jurisdiction and 
nation's individual 
requirements 
without 
degradation to 
overall system 
performance. 
2.3 The concerns 
regarding 
unavailability of 
network resources 
for special users 
who need more 
resources under 
specific 
circumstances and 
conditions.  
Networ
k 
prioriti
zed 
users 
Prioritizati
on when 
using 
resources 
Communic
ation under 
specific 
conditions 
Anywhere Availability 
of resources 
in 
emergency 
situation  
Possibil
ity for 
prioritiz
ing  
access 
to 
resourc
es 
Access to the 
network shall be 
controlled by 
using 
functionalities 
such as assigning 
priority to 
potential users, 
thereby restricting 
some parties from 
access to the 
network under 
certain 
circumstances. 
Table 3: VCT derived from [6]. 
In addition to the requirements derived from the Euler documents, we have made an own 
analysis of the scenario described in Appendix 2. This analysis resulted in a set of additional 
statements and needs, which are summarized in the table below. 
Statement Who What When Where Why How Need 
3.1 When two 
NIBs from 
different 
organizations are 
connected on the 
field, it must be 
possible for the 
NIB to securely 
authenticate 
connecting NIB.  
NIB 
manager 
NIB 
node 
Two 
different 
IANs are 
connected 
Anywhere Prevent 
unauthoriz
ed IAN 
access 
Secure 
authentic
ation 
When two NIBs 
from different 
organizations are 
connected on the 
field, it must be 
possible for the 
NIB to securely 
authenticate the 
connecting NIB. 
3.2 When two 
NIBs from 
different 
organizations are 
NIB 
manager 
NIB 
node 
Two 
different 
IANs are 
connected 
Anywhere Prevent 
malicious 
NIB to 
connect to 
Check of 
connecti
ng NIB 
software/
When two NIBs 
from different 
organizations are 
connected on the 
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connected on the 
field,  it must be 
possible to verify 
that the connecting 
NIB is in a 
trustworthy state 
prior to giving it 
access to the  IAN. 
IAN hardware 
states 
and 
configura
tions 
field,  it must be 
possible to verify 
that the connecting 
NIB is in a 
trustworthy state 
prior to giving it 
access to the  IAN. 
3.3 When a PSCD 
roams to a visiting 
IAN, it must be 
possible for the 
NIB in the visiting 
IAN to securely 
authenticate 
connecting PSCD. 
NIB 
manager 
PSCD 
node 
Roaming 
PSCD 
Anywhere Prevent 
unauthoriz
ed IAN 
access 
Secure 
authentic
ation 
When a PSCD 
roams to a visiting 
IAN, it must be 
possible for the 
NIB in the visiting 
IAN to securely 
authenticate 
connecting PSCD. 
3.4 When a PSCD 
roams to a visiting 
IAN, it must be 
possible for the 
NIB in the visiting 
IAN, to verify that 
the connecting 
PSCD is in a 
trustworthy state 
prior to giving   
access to the  IAN. 
NIB 
manager 
NIB 
node 
Roaming 
PSCD 
Anywhere Prevent 
malicious 
PSCD to 
connect to 
IAN 
Check of 
connecti
ng NIB 
software/
hardware 
states 
and 
configura
tions 
When a PSCD 
roams to a visiting 
IAN, it must be 
possible for the 
NIB in the visiting 
IAN, to verify  that 
the connecting 
PSCD is in a 
trustworthy state 
prior to giving  
access to the  IAN. 
3.5 When two 
NIBs from 
different 
organizations are 
connected on the 
field, it must be 
possible for the 
NIB to securely 
verify the detailed 
security policies 
that apply for the 
connecting IAN 
and provide access 
based on the 
policies. 
NIB 
manager 
NIB 
node 
Two 
different 
IANs are 
connected 
Anywhere Prevent 
unauthoriz
ed access 
to 
sensitive 
IAN 
informatio
n 
Check of 
connecti
ng NIB 
security 
policies 
When two NIBs 
from different 
organizations are 
connected on the 
field, it must be 
possible for the 
NIB to securely 
verify the detailed 
security policies 
that apply for the 
connecting IAN 
and provide access 
based on the 
policies. 
3.6 After two NIB 
are connected on 
the field, the 
security policies 
that apply for the 
connecting IAN 
NIB 
Manager 
NIB 
node 
Two 
different 
IANs are 
connected 
Anywhere Prevent 
unauthoriz
ed load 
and 
modificati
on of 
Secure 
update of 
security 
policies 
After two NIB are 
connected on the 
field, the security 
policies that apply 
for the connecting 
IAN can be 
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can be updated and 
changed securely.  
policies.  updated and 
changed securely. 
3.7 When a PSCD 
roams to a visiting 
IAN, it must be 
possible for the 
NIB in the visiting 
IAN to securely 
verify the detailed 
security policies 
that apply for the 
connecting PSCD 
and provide access 
based on the 
policies. 
NIB 
manager 
NIB 
node 
Roaming 
PSCD 
Anywhere Prevent 
unauthoriz
ed access 
to 
sensitive 
IAN 
informatio
n 
Check of 
connecti
ng PSCD 
security 
policies 
When a PSCD 
roams to a visiting 
IAN, it must be 
possible for the 
NIB in the visiting 
IAN to securely 
verify the detailed 
security policies 
that apply for the 
connecting PSCD 
and provide access 
based on the 
policies. 
Table 4: Statements derived from the scenario described in Appendix 2. 
4.1.2 Hierarchy diagram 
Figure 1 shows the hierarchy diagram we have derived from the voice of the customer tables 
in Section 4.1.1. 
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Figure 2: Hierarchy diagram. 
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4.2 Requirements 
Finally, we map the needs and requirements identified in the previous steps into a table that 
summarize the architecture driving requirements. The document we started from already had 
a fairly detailed level with several requirements identified. Hence, we have been able to 
directly map most of the needs and requirements from the source documents into architecture 
driving requirements. 
Needs Requirements 
Protection of owner /user /equipment information e.g., 
Identity and physical position (1.16) 
A.1 The NIB and PSCD shall provide confidentiality 
protection of owner information at storage and at 
transfer. 
A.2 The NIB and PSCD shall provide confidentiality 
protection of user information at storage and at 
transfer. 
A.3 The NIB and PSCD shall provide confidentiality 
protection of equipment information at storage and at 
transfer. 
Protection of cryptographic data (keys, passwords, 
PINs and access codes) (1.16) 
A.4 The NIB and PSCD shall provide confidentiality 
protection of all kinds of cryptographic data at storage 
and at transfer. 
Integrity protection of user traffic (1.17) B.1 The NIB and PSCD shall provide Integrity 
protection of user traffic. 
Integrity protection of network control and 
management data (1.17) 
B.2 The NIB and PSCD shall provide integrity 
protection of network control and management data. 
Integrity protection of radio control data (1.17) B.3 The NIB and PSCD shall provide integrity 
protection of radio control data. 
Integrity protection of configuration data for SDR 
(1.17) 
B.4 The NIB shall provide integrity protection of 
configuration data for SDR at storage and at transfer. 
Integrity protection of cryptographic data (keys, 
passwords, PINs and access codes)  (1.17) 
B.5 The NIB and PSCD shall provide integrity 
protection of all kinds of cryptographic data at storage 
and at transfer. 
Integrity protection of security policies for SDR 
platform (1.17 
B.6 The NIB shall provide integrity protection of 
security policies for SDR platform at storage and at 
transfer. 
Integrity protection of SDR waveforms and roles login 
data (1.17) 
B.7 The NIB shall provide integrity protection of SDR 
waveforms and roles login data at storage and at 
transfer. 
Integrity protection of SDR platform SW including 
cryptographic algorithms and parameters (1.17) 
B.8 The NIB shall provide integrity protection of SDR 
platform SW including cryptographic algorithms and 
parameters at storage and at transfer. 
Integrity protection of SDR platform HW including 
cryptographic modules (1.17) 
B.9 The NIB shall provide integrity protection of SDR 
platform HW including cryptographic modules. 
Voice based authentication of NIB SDR users (1.15) C.1 The NIB shall support voice based authentication 
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of NIB SDR users. 
NIB SDR attestation of its configuration to service 
providers (1.13) 
C.2 The NIB shall support SDR attestation of its 
configuration to service providers. 
The NIB must perform the necessary authentication 
and trust verification of connecting NIBs from other 
IANs (1.12) 
C.3The NIB shall authenticate and verify the 
trustworthiness of connecting NIBs from other IANs. 
Access to the network shall be controlled by using 
functionalities such as assigning priority to potential 
users. (2.3) 
C.4 The NIB shall support role based access control to 
the IAN services behind the NIB.  
C. 5. The NIB shall support assignment of 
differentiated  service levels for connecting NIBs 
(from other IANs) and PSCDs. 
When two NIBs connect on the field, it must be 
possible for the NIBs to securely authenticate the 
connecting NIB. (3.1) 
C.6 The NIB shall support strong authentication of all 
connecting NIBs from other IANs. 
It must be possible to verify that the connecting NIB is 
in a trustworthy state prior to giving it access to the  
IAN. (3.2) 
C.7 It must be possible to verify that the connecting 
NIB is in a trustworthy state prior to giving it access to 
the  IAN. 
When a PSCD roams to a visiting IAN, it must be 
possible for the NIB in the visiting IAN to securely 
authenticate connecting PSCD. (3.3) 
C.8 When a PSCD roams to a visiting IAN, it must be 
possible for the NIB in the visiting IAN to 
authenticate the connecting PSCD using strong 
authentication. 
When a PSCD roams to a visiting IAN, it must be 
possible for the NIB in the visiting IAN, to verify  that 
the connecting PSCD is in a trustworthy state prior to 
giving  access to the  IAN. (3.4) 
C.8 When a PSCD roams to a visiting IAN, it must be 
possible for the NIB in the visiting IAN, to verify  that 
the connecting PSCD is in a trustworthy state prior to 
giving  access to the  IAN. 
It must be possible for the NIB to securely verify the 
detailed security policies that apply for a connecting 
IAN (behind a NIB) and provide access based on the 
policies. (3.5) 
C.9 It must be possible for the NIB to securely verify 
the detailed security policies that apply for a 
connecting IAN (behind a NIB) and provide access 
based on the policies. 
The NIB must be able to update and enforce IAN 
security policies (3.6) 
C.10 The NIB shall prevent unauthorized loading of 
security policies. 
C.11 The NIB shall prevent unauthorized 
establishment of security policies. 
C.12 The NIB shall securely verify that all security 
policies are originated from a trusted party. 
C.13 The NIB shall ensure the integrity of over-the-air 
download and stored security policies. 
C.14 The NIB shall check the integrity of loaded 
security policies. 
C.15 The NIB shall check the compatibility of loaded 
security policies with local policies. 
C.16 The NIB shall log the results of all integrity and 
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authenticity checks for received security policies. 
When a PSCD roams to a visiting IAN, it must be 
possible for the NIB in the visiting IAN to securely 
verify the detailed security policies that apply for the 
connecting PSCD and provide access based on the 
policies. (3.7) 
C.17 When a PSCD roams to a visiting IAN, it must 
be possible for the NIB in the visiting IAN to securely 
verify the detailed security policies that apply for the 
connecting PSCD and provide access based on the 
policies. 
Prevent loading, installation, instantiation of 
unauthorized SDR software (1.14) 
D.1 The NIB shall prevent any loading of 
unauthorized SDR software. 
D.2 The NIB shall prevent any installation of 
unauthorized SDR software. 
D.3 The NIB shall prevent any instantiation of 
unauthorized SDR software. 
Verify downloaded SDR software from trusted vendor 
(1.14) 
D.4 The NIB shall securely verify that all downloaded 
SDR software origin from a trusted vendor. 
Ensure confidentiality and integrity of over-the-air 
software download and stored data (1.14) 
D.5 The NIB and PSCD shall ensure confidentiality 
and integrity of over-the-air software download and 
stored data. (Detailed requirements: A.1-A.3 and B.1-
B.9)
1
. 
Ensure the terminal operates within allowed frequency 
bands and power levels specified by local regulators 
(1.14) 
D.6 The NIB shall verify that it operates within 
allowed frequency bands and power levels specified 
by local regulators. 
After loading SDR configuration parameters, they 
shall be checked by the radio for integrity and 
authenticity and for compatibility.  (1.18) 
D.7 The NIB shall check the integrity of loaded SDR 
configuration parameters. 
D.8 The NIB shall check the authenticity of loaded 
SDR configuration parameters. 
D.9 The NIB shall check the compatibility of loaded 
SDR configuration parameters. 
The result of an integrity and authenticity check for 
received SDR configuration parameter set(s) shall be 
an auditable event. (1.18) 
D.10 The NIB shall log the results of all integrity and 
authenticity checks for received SDR configuration 
parameter set(s). 
NIB SDR policy download, certificate verification, 
parsing, compiling, loading and activation (1.13) 
D.11 The NIB shall support secure (integrity protected 
and authenticated) downloading of SDR polices. 
D.12 The NIB shall verify SDR certificates. 
D.13 The NIB shall be able to securely parse and 
compile SDR policies. 
D.14 The NIB shall be able to secure load and activate 
SDR policies. 
The basic security platforms should be capable of D.15 The NIB shall be able to handle nation specific 
                                                 
1
 This requirement is maybe too general to fit at this level but anyway indicate important requirements on 
software installation and is included for completeness. 
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being expanded and enhanced to meet each 
jurisdiction and nation's individual requirements with 
reasonable performance impact (2.2). 
SDR policies. 
D.16 The NIB shall be able to handle nation specific 
SDR policies with small performance penalties.
2
 
Strict verification of approved NIB software such as 
formal verification/evaluation of NIB software (1.9) 
E.1 Preferably, the NIB shall only run software 
subject to formal verification. 
The NIB software integrity must always be kept at  run 
time (1.12) 
E.2 The NIB shall implement means to ensure the NIB 
software integrity at run time. 
The NIB must implement and enforce IAN to external 
IAN security policies (1.12) 
F.1 The NIB shall implement a policy enforcement 
engine that prevents any information flows that 
contradicts the agreed security policies between IANs. 
 
Tamper resistant NIB hardware design (1.10) H.1 The NIB should be implemented using tamper 
resistant hardware design. 
Table 5: Identified architecture driving requirements. 
                                                 
2
 This is hardly a security requirement and should be considered to be removed from the requirements lists. 
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5 Discussion 
In this report, a detailed security requirements analysis has been performed for two different 
usage scenarios. These two scenarios were chosen based on the current needs of stakeholders, 
with the aim of having a sound basis for the research issues we expect to tackle at the next 
project phase. The selected use cases are rather different in their respective set-ups and 
introduced roles. Anyhow, they have rather many, technical requirements in common. Below, 
we summarize the main commonalities and differences and discuss directions for the future 
work in WP3 based on this analysis. 
5.1 Common requirements 
5.1.1 Communication security 
In both scenarios, communication over unsecure channels is needed. This implies basic 
integrity and confidentiality protection requirements on the communication channels as well 
as authentication of communication end-points. The first scenario, usage of COTS, does not 
imply any new challenges in this respect as it is a traditional client server model. The second 
scenario, the incident network scenario, is a bit demanding as it involves more end-points and 
entities from several organizations.  
Even if communication security is important, we do not expect to spend much time on 
working with solutions that fulfill these requirements except when they have connection to 
platform security requirements as those are the most challenging and interesting issues from a 
research perspective. 
5.1.2 Node security 
Both analyses have identified security requirements on the involved nodes. While there are 
equal emphasis on node intrusion protection and node integrity in the requirements from the 
first scenario, the second scenario have much broader set of requirements with specific 
requirement on software upgrade and in particular secure policy handling in the nodes. 
However, especially on the node integrity there are requirements in common that can form 
the basis for common solutions in the future as well. 
5.2 Major differences 
The incident network scenario involves SDR units with high security requirement on the 
radio definition software. These types of requirements are obviously not present in the COTS 
usage scenario. However, when detailing out trust based security architecture for both 
scenarios working with in depth technology analysis, we will probably see that particular 
mechanisms with respect to software management could be applied to both scenarios. 
In the first scenario, several high level usability and simplicity requirements have been 
identified. These are general and should in principle also apply to the second scenario even if 
no such requirements have been identified in the requirements process. 
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The requirements from the analysis of the incident network scenarios related to cross-
organizational co-operation do not appear in the first scenario. However, actually they could 
be useful for a more general COTS usage scenario where information is shared between 
several different organizations. 
5.3 Suggestions for next project phase 
During the next phase of the project, we will work with defining a security architecture that 
meets at least a selected subset of the identified security requirements. The focus will be on 
the requirements related to node security, software and policy integrity and platform 
verification. This implies that we will spend less time on the pure communication security 
issues. We also expect to give a rather broad overview of state-of-the art technology in the 
area of trusted computing and secure software management. 
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1 Introduction 
Secure communications are required in many applications, by individuals as well as by 
organizations. The level of trust required in the security of the communication varies depending 
on the users and the setting. An individual living a normal life will probably be satisfied with a 
lower security and trust level than an organization communicating information that is of great 
commercial value. In civilian applications communication has traditionally been kept secure by 
using means of communication for which interception requires physical access, and this access 
has been prohibited by physical protection and legislation. When this level of protection has not 
been enough people have had to meet in person. 
New communication technology has given rise to new means and methods for communication, 
foremost of which is the Internet, and IP based communication in general. When communication 
is based on IP, and certainly on the Internet, the user has little knowledge of the route taken by 
the information flow. This means that the physical protection of the information infrastructure 
yields little trust in the security. No single entity has control of all nodes that could possibly be 
part of the route between the communicating parties, so nobody can tell if the route is secure.  
The move from analog to digital transmission and processing has also change the security 
situation. Unauthorized interaction with analog equipment often requires physical access in 
combination with complicated and expensive equipment. For unauthorized interaction with 
digital equipment it often suffices with software tools operated at a (possibly global) distance. 
They may still be complicated, but they are often very cheap, or even free of charge. 
For the above mentioned reasons there is a need for technology securing digital communications. 
Such technologies exist, both commercially and non-commercially, in the form of cryptographic 
algorithms used in tools for encrypted communication. In many cases such tools are 
implemented in software and run on a personal computer. If the implementation is carefully 
made and without serious bugs, such a communication tool can be secure. However, a problem 
with running a security application on an ordinary personal computer is that the behavior of the 
security application may be influenced by other applications running on the same computer. It 
may be unfortunate interactions with other applications that are otherwise correct, it may be 
ordinary malware or it may even be an attack by a piece of software aimed at this specific user 
and security application. 
In view of this our opinion is that that to reach a high level of trust in a secure communication 
tool implemented on a personal computer, a security mechanism is needed to guarantee the 
integrity of the platform. In some way it must also be possible to communicate this guarantee to 
the other parties in the communication, so that it can be verified and mutual trust can be 
established. By using a custom made, dedicated platform for any security applications it is 
possible to reach very high levels of trust, but in all but the most security focused situations this 
is far to expensive. 
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In this report, we present a scenario which we call ―Trusted communication using COTS‖. This 
scenario is one of two chosen scenarios that will serve as basis for the requirements analysis we 
will perform in the ARIES WP3. The requirements derivation will be done in three steps:  
1. Detailed scenario descriptions (this document) 
2. Identifications of needs based on the chosen scenarios 
3. Mapping of the needs into requirements 
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2 Scenario description 
2.1 Basic scenario 
The situation we consider is the communication between a number of users in an organization 
called Enjeel, requiring a high level of security, and trust in the platform implementing the 
secure communication. Due to the mobility of the users, communication over the Internet is 
deemed to be the only viable solution, especially since they require video conferencing and 
possibility for file exchange in addition to voice communication. For the communication solution 
to be economically feasible it has to be implemented using standard components, COTS. 
The communication platform of choice is a normal laptop computer. Each user will be given 
such a computer, equipped with communication software. It is desirable that the computers will 
also be available for other, non-security related software. Communication between parties is 
done through an intermediary in the form of an Internet-connected server that resides under the 
control of the users’ organization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Communication between two parties using a central server. 
 
There is a third party, Eve, who is interested in listening in on the communication between Alice 
and Bob. Eve is a representative of a resourceful organization called Deamin, willing to invest 
both time and money in breaking the secure communication, and they are in no hurry. Enjeel has 
decided that a simple VPN connection, though secure enough in itself, is too susceptible to IT 
attacks against the mobile computers. Even if one user, say Alice, is very careful with her 
computer, she has no way of knowing that the user in the other end, say Bob, is in possession of 
Mobile user Alice 
Mobile user Bob 
Communication server 
Internet 
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an uncompromised computer. Thus the Enjeel organization needs a way of ensuring the software 
integrity of the computers used for communication, and preferably a way for those computers to 
prove their integrity to connecting parties. 
2.2 Network Scenario 
A simple variation of the basic scenario is when one or more of the connected parties are 
replaced by local area networks in which there may be several users. The local area networks are 
not mobile but are a part of the infrastructure under the control of the Enjeel organisation. In 
such cases the computers of the users have some level of protection from the Internet since they 
are not directly exposed.  
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3 Actors 
Within the described scenario there are the following actors (or roles): 
 Users (Alice and Bob) 
 Attacker (Eve) 
 Server 
3.1 Users 
The users are the mobile parties with the need to communicate. Any user may want to 
communicate with the server, another user or a group of other users. The users are assumed to be 
experienced computer users, but not IT experts or security professionals. They are assumed to 
understand the need for security, but to have a limited acceptance for inconvenience due to 
security measures. Any security solutions will have to incorporate a reasonable level of usability. 
3.2 Attacker 
The attacker is an agent of an organization wanting information from the organization of the 
users. In contrast to the users, the attacker is a highly trained expert, willing to use large amounts 
of time and resources to acquire information from the users and their organization. The attacker 
is assumed to be willing to accept some risk of being caught using illegal methods for getting the 
information, but not to use overt or violent methods.  
3.3 Server 
The server is the hub of the secure communication. It is assumed to be physically secure, but 
since it is connected to the Internet it may be susceptible to network attacks. The server is 
handled by IT experts who also install and handle the computers of the users. 
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4 Scope and Limitations 
The aim of the system for high-security communication is to support the confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of the communicated information. In order to achieve this, we are interested in 
upholding the integrity of the computers used for communication and in how to build and 
distribute trust about this to all the parties involved in the communication. This means that we 
need to measure the software state of the computers in a secure way in order to be able to trust 
the computers. This is related to software correctness in the sense that correctness is a 
prerequisite for trust to be possible. We will however not address issues regarding software 
development or verification in this project. Instead we focus on the problem of assuring and 
proving that the intended software, and nothing else, is loaded and running. 
4.1 Research issues 
Considering the scope and limitations described above, we will address the following research 
questions: 
 What are the needs of the involved parties? 
 What requirements should be fulfilled in order to address the identified needs? 
 What level of trust can be established regarding the identity of entities reached over an 
open network? 
 To what degree can hardware be trusted? 
 How can trust in the integrity of software be established? 
 What level of trust can be established without the use of expensive certification? 
 
 ARIES WP3    2010-10-18  Ver. 02 
 - 1 - 
Appendix 2: ARIES WP3 – Scenario Input: 
Trust Establishment for Cross-
organizational Crises Management 
  Christian Gehrmann      Mehran Ahsant 
          SICS         Saab Systems 
           
 ARIES WP3    2010-10-18  Ver. 02 
 - 2 - 
Abbreviations 
IAN  Incident Area Network 
JAN  Jurisdiction Area Network 
NIB  Network-in-a-Box 
PSCD  Public Safety Communications Device 
SDR   Software Defined Radio 
 
 ARIES WP3    2010-10-18  Ver. 02 
 - 3 - 
Contents 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 4 
2 Scenario description ................................................................................................................ 5 
3 Actors....................................................................................................................................... 9 
3.1 JAN manager .................................................................................................................... 9 
3.2 NIB manager .................................................................................................................... 9 
3.3 PSCD user ........................................................................................................................ 9 
4 Scope ..................................................................................................................................... 10 
4.1 Limitations ..................................................................................................................... 10 
4.2 Research issues ............................................................................................................... 10 
4.2.1 SDR life cycle ......................................................................................................... 10 
4.2.2 Trust establishment ................................................................................................. 11 
5 References ............................................................................................................................. 12 
 
 ARIES WP3    2010-10-18  Ver. 02 
 - 4 - 
1 Introduction 
There is an increasing demand for improved communication infrastructures that can support 
efficient management in case of civil crises such as terror attacks, natural disasters, and large 
accidents etc., but also for surveillance at large public events and similar. The information 
systems for these applications have so far mainly been created on national level and with diverse 
systems for different authorities such as the army, the police force, fire brigades and ambulance 
services.  As one currently see a strong need for closer co-operation between different authorities 
and between organizations in different countries, the old communication infrastructures must be 
upgraded and interoperability between systems is needed.  
The road towards new communication infrastructures with good interoperability goes through 
usage of common interfaces on all levels spanning from the radio interfaces up to the application 
layer interfaces and data structures. There also exist several initiatives to make this happen. One 
such initiative is the European FP7 Euler project [1] that aims at creating fully programmable 
radios, Software Defined Radios (SDR), with standardized software interface. The ultimate goal 
in that project is to design a system architecture including radio waveform that allows not only 
interoperability between crises organizations on the fields but also software portability across 
platforms from different organizations and suppliers.   
Interoperability and common software come at the prize of a higher security risk. Common 
interfaces can be utilized by hostile organizations or individuals to launch attacks against the 
infrastructures. Similar, flexibility in the form of SDR also open up against new software attacks 
that threaten to destroy the very core functionality in wireless crises networks for instance. This 
gives new research challenges on how to guarantee the security of the communication platforms 
as well as the communication itself. Without appropriate security mechanisms in place, we 
cannot achieve the confidence and trust in the new systems, this in turn, will prevent the 
introduction/usage of the new more flexible infrastructures.  
In this report, we present a scenario we call ―Trust establishment for cross-organizational crises 
management‖. This scenario is one of two chosen scenarios that will serve as basis for the 
requirements analysis we will perform in the ARIES WP3. In all, the requirements derivation 
will be done in three steps:  
1. Detailed scenario descriptions (this document) 
2. Identifications of needs based on the chosen scenarios 
3. Mapping of the needs into requirements 
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2 Scenario description 
The situation we consider is the communication and collaboration between a collection of so-
called Incident Area Networks (IANs), which are being deployed on the scene of a crisis as 
depicted in Figure 3. Each IAN is administered and owned by a public safety organization, and 
enables communications within this organization, in the area of the event. IANs may also use 
different waveforms for their internal communications.   
A typical IAN consists of 
 A vehicle-based ―Network-In-a-Box‖ (NIB), i.e. a fully autonomous and transportable 
network infrastructure, with base station and all necessary network switching and control 
functions 
 A fleet of user terminals, called Public Safety Communications Devices (PSCDs) 
Optionally, this elementary IAN is also connected to the organizations permanent terrestrial 
infrastructure, which is called a Jurisdiction Area Network (JAN). 
 
Figure 4: Incident Area Network. 
The NIB communication platform might have several radio interfaces. One or several of these 
interfaces might be SDR based interfaces, which allows switching between all installed 
waveforms. There might be even a case that requires installing and using new or additional radio 
waveforms. That is, the SDR can be either pre-configured or updated and configured 
dynamically when needed. 
The PSCD devices typically can only communicate with pre-defined radio and communication 
protocols.  
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In addition to the basic IAN scenario described above, we particularly  consider two different 
cross-organizational roaming scenarios: 
1. A team from one organization (IAN1) is co-operating at an incident area with a team 
from another organization (IAN2) and would like to allow connectivity and information 
exchange between the two organizations at the incident area, see Figure 5. These two 
organizations are potentially using different radio waveforms and if that is the case, the 
NIB in at least one of the two IANs must be re-configured to allow connectivity between 
the two NIBs in the system. 
2. One or several people belonging to one crises management organization are working 
together with people (visiting) in an incident area from another organization and need to 
be able to share information and communicate with all other people within the hosting 
IAN, see Figure 6. Potentially, the visiting PSCD is an SDR units and needs to be 
reconfigured to allow communication with the NIB in the IAN or the NIB SDR is 
updated with an appropriate waveform and configuration to allow communication with 
the visiting PSCD. 
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Figure 5: Cross-organizational co-operation at incident area. 
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Figure 6: Visiting PSCD. 
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3 Actors 
Within each organization we distinguish between the following actors (or roles): 
 The JAN manager 
 The NIB manager 
 PSCD user 
 Attacker 
3.1 JAN manager 
The JAN manager has the authority to access all information within a JAN and corresponding 
IANs. It is the responsibility of the JAN manager to issue the credentials to all users within one 
organization (IAN) and to configure or to delegate the administration of configurations in the 
JAN/IAN including setting the security policies to another entity. 
3.2 NIB manager 
It is the responsibility of the NIB manager to configure the NIB including setting the security 
policies for the IAN that the NIB belongs to.  
3.3 PSCD user 
The PSCD is the user who uses the PSCD in his/her daily operations.  
3.4 Attacker 
The attacker tries to impersonate legitimate PSCD and NIB users or tries to get hold of IAN, 
JAN or secret information or to modify IAN or JAN data or software in order to get hold of 
information or to destroy the normal operation of the system. 
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4 Scope 
4.1 Limitations 
We are interested in investigating the security needs that arise as a consequence of the cross-
organizational as well as the introduction of SDR units in the crises management systems we 
have described in Section 2.  Our investigation will consider the needs of security and trust for 
agile and dynamic cross-organizational interactions using SDR-based communications with 
minimum level of trust in terms of pre-configurations and agreements. The work will be carried 
out starting from identifying and analyzing the needs of the three actors identified earlier in this 
document. The ultimate goal is to investigate the mechanisms that are needed to make all parties 
trust the crises communication infrastructure, when there is direct or indirect interaction between 
users from different organizations and SDR devices in the systems. 
 
We will here focus on security needs stemming from the SDR,  IAN 1 to IAN2 as well as 
visiting PSCD scenarios. We will primarily not deal with security issues related to how 
information is protected or securely accessed in the JAN or how information between different 
JANs can be shared. 
4.2 Research issues 
Considering the limitations we have described in Section 4 above, we have decided to sort the 
security issues we will address from two different angles: 
 SDR life cycle management 
 Trust establishment 
The SDR life cycle management issues relates to the handling of the SDR modules in the NIB. 
The trust establishment issues relates to the interconnection of two IANs (through the NIBs) and 
to allowing communication with a visiting PSCD in a hosting IAN. 
4.2.1 SDR life cycle 
The SDR life cycle consist of the following major NIB states: 
1. PSCD configurations at manufacture 
2. First time installation of SDR module 
3. SDR module active and running 
4. SDR module update 
The issues connected to these states include (not at all an exhaustive list): 
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 What type of hardware support (cryptographic, shielded storage, ROM, keys etc.) do we 
require/need in the radio platforms 
 What type of different models should one support with respect to secure identification of 
radio platform hardware? 
 How the SDR module is securely installed into the platform and how can verify the 
integrity of the SDR module? 
 Different options for securing the SDR execution environment from active attacks. How 
is the SDR execution environment verified? 
 How are the SDR module securely updated? Different update models? 
4.2.2 Trust establishment 
The issues connected to trust establishment when interconnecting two IANs through two NIBs or 
when a visiting PSCD connects to an IAN include (not at all an exhaustive list): 
 Establish if the connecting NIB or visiting PSCD and the network behind the NIB is 
trustworthy 
o Who owns and runs the NIB or PSCD? 
o Hardware platform and ID of connecting NIB or PSCD? 
o Software configuration of connecting NIB or PSCD? 
o Security policies that applies in the connecting IAN/JAN (IAN merge) case? 
o Security policies that applies for the visiting PSCD? 
o Security policies that applies for the IAN that the visiting PSCD connects to? 
 How to configure and enforce security rules for all information that goes to and from the 
connecting NIB or visiting PSCD? 
  Dynamically measure the degree of trustworthiness in the connecting NIB  or PSCD 
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